Problems with One Size Fits All Settlements in the GM 6.2 Class action

Problems with Treating the GM 6.2L L87 Litigation as a One-Size-Fits-All Class Action

Powell et al. v. General Motors LLC, No. 4:25-cv-10479 (E.D. Mich.)  •  Consolidated complaint filed Feb. 26, 2026  •  Motion to dismiss pending
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1. Description of the Proposed Class Action

We've all gotten them, a court notice indicating we may be entitled to $17 as part of a class action settlement and typically we ignore it.  Few people protest smaller class action settlements and in some sense they're doing what the law intended, providing a remedy for smaller claims that cannot be handled individually.  However, potentially larger claims pose logistical problems,  what happens if people do want to get involved, some seek early settlement but others potential maximum recovery.  Claims can vary, and that becomes significant if the case is larger.  This page examines potential problems with the class. 



The consolidated L87 litigation covers roughly 600,000 model-year 2019–2024 Chevrolet, GMC, and Cadillac trucks and SUVs. Owners allege manufacturing defects in connecting rods, crankshaft oil galleries, and bearing surfaces that can cause sudden seizure and loss of propulsion. GM issued NHTSA Recall 25V-274 in April 2025 (inspection, 0W-40 oil change, or engine replacement, plus a 10-year/150,000-mile extended powertrain warranty) and has moved to dismiss on the ground that the recall already supplies the relief sought. NHTSA has since opened a follow-on engineering analysis after reports of post-remedy failures.

Class counsel typically argue superiority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) by quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997): the class device exists because “small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action.” That premise is controverted here.  A complete L87 replacement commonly runs $8,000–$18,000 in parts and labor, plus towing, rental, diminished value, and lost use. Those figures are large enough to support individual suits—especially where fee-shifting statutes apply (state lemon laws, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2), and many state UDAP statutes). Courts have long recognized that when per-plaintiff damages are substantial, the “negative value” rationale for class treatment evaporates. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (individual actions preferred where recoveries are not trivial); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018–21 (7th Cir. 2002) (auto-defect claims often turn on vehicle-specific facts and are poorly suited to a single nationwide class).

GM's own briefing underscores the point: it contends that owners whose engines never failed lack Article III injury, and that owners who received a free replacement or warranty extension have already been made whole. Those arguments, if accepted even in part, leave a residue of high-value individual claims (failed engines out of warranty, repeat failures after the oil-change “remedy,” or vehicles outside the recall population) that are more efficiently tried one-by-one or in small groups than as a sprawling class.

Rule 23(a)(3) typicality and 23(b)(3) predominance require that claims be sufficiently similar to group them as a class.  Here, claims can vary,  Compare:

•          Someone with multiple engine replacement versus someone with one or even none.   Someone with limited use versus someone with substantial mileage.  

•          A lessee who returned the vehicle before any symptom appeared, versus a retail purchaser who still owns the truck and must disclose the recall at resale.

Those differences are not mere damages variations. They change the legal theory: express-warranty breach, implied-warranty merchantability, fraudulent concealment, Magnuson-Moss, lemon-law repurchase, unjust enrichment, and diminished-value claims do not travel together. Courts routinely refuse certification where “a class action would present a myraid of individual issues.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (common contention must be capable of classwide resolution); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (damages model must measure only the theory common to the class).  GM has also argued that a 3% observed failure rate is inconsistent with a uniform design defect.  That figure is justly questioned but there is clearly some variation in the amount and rate of problems. 

Situations differ sharply by mileage and build period:

•          Low-mileage failures (including reports of engines failing in the first few thousand miles) look like manufacturing defects still within original bumper-to-bumper or powertrain coverage, or lemon-law windows.

•          Mid-mileage failures after the recall “oil-only” remedy raise a different question: was the recall adequate? NHTSA's 2026 engineering analysis of post-remedy failures (hundreds of ODI reports; thousands of complaints GM itself logged) is evidence that this subgroup's claim is not the same as the pre-recall seizure claim.

•          High-mileage vehicles near or past 150,000 miles may fall outside the extended warranty GM offered and face comparative-fault, maintenance, and useful-life defenses that low-mileage trucks do not.

•          2019–early-2021 builds sit partly outside Recall 25V-274's production window even though some complaints and some complaints treat them as part of the same defect family. That jurisdictional and notice mismatch is a classic predominance fracture.

Individualized proof of mileage at failure, oil-change intervals, whether 0W-20 or 0W-40 was in the crankcase, whether a connecting-rod knock code was stored, and whether the owner accepted the recall remedy will dominate any trial. Those facts also change settlement value: a 12,000-mile seized Escalade is not the same case as a 140,000-mile Sierra that never knocked.

A nationwide class may still be certified for settlement, or narrowed subclasses may be certified for particular issues (e.g., adequacy of the oil-change remedy). But owners with documented catastrophic failure, out-of-pocket replacement costs, or lemon-law eligibility should not assume the class is the only—or the best—forum. Those claims are often large enough, and factually distinct enough, to justify individual filing, state-court lemon-law actions, or smaller coordinated groups. Expectations, remedies, and proof will vary with mileage, production date, recall status, and whether the engine actually failed. Treat the class as one option, not the default.

Principal authorities cited

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(3); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d); NHTSA Recall 25V-274; Powell v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 4:25-cv-10479 (E.D. Mich.).