Attached is the State of New York analysis of the New York lemon law.  (Note that we are a private law firm not affiliated with the State, and do not necessarily adopt any statements or assessments in this report). 

Annual Report - 2003  NEW YORK'S NEW CAR LEMON LAW ARBITRATION PROGRAM Attorney General New York State Department of Law NEW YORK'S NEW CAR LEMON LAW ARBITRATION PROGRAM
ANNUAL REPORT -- 2003 ...THOMAS CONWAY Assistant Attorney General in Charge NEW CAR LEMON LAW UNIT:
SUSAN J. BIEBER Lemon Law Coordinator Elisa Melendez Veronica Vargas Student Aides
(minor editorial changes have been in form and deletions by this website) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Summary of 2003 Statistics ...............................................................
Seventeen Year Statistical Summary: 1987-2003 .............................. 
Introduction........................................................................................
The Lemon Law -A Summary ............................................................
Statistical Analysis
I. Applications
A. Submission of Applications ............................................................
B. Review By the Attorney General's Office ....................................  
C. Applications "Filed... .....................................................................
II. Time Between Filing Date and Hearing............................................
III. Hearings........................................................................................
IV. Dispositions. Arbitration Awards.....................................................
(1) Cash Refund Awards ................................................................
(2) Manufacturers' Scorecard ..........................................................
(3) Vehicle Replacement Awards ...................................................
(4) Awards Involving Leased Cars..................................................
B. Settlements .................................................................................
C. Withdrawals................................................................................
D. Total Dispositions........................................................................
E. 2003 Total Recovery ..................................................................
F. Seventeen Year Grand Total Recoveries.....................................
V. Time Between Filing Date and Decision....................................................
VI. Time Between Hearing and Decision .......................................................
VII. Manufacturers' Compliance with Awards ...............................................
Legislative Activity ......................................................................................................
Appendix ......................................................................................................................
Cumulative List of Decisions ............................................................................
Recent Decisions .............................................................................................

TABLE OF CHARTS
Chart Description Page
Applications Received by Region
(2003 & Cumulative)
6-7
2. Attorney General's Review 8
3. Eight Year Comparison of Award
Statistics With Seventeen Year Totals 10
4. 2003 Awards, by Region 11
5. Percentage of 2003 Awards for
Consumer and Manufacturer (by
Region) 12-13
6. 2003 Awards (by Manufacturer) 14
7 2003 Cash Awards (by Manufacturer) 15
8. 1987-2003 Summary of Cash Awards
(by Manufacturer) 16
9. 2003 Settlement Survey 18
10. 1987-2003 Settlement Survey 19
11. 2003 Settlements 20
12. Total 2003 Dispositions (by
Manufacturer) 21
13. 2003 Compliance Survey 23
SUMMARY OF 2003 STATISTICS
Applications Received:
Applications Accepted:
Hearings Scheduled:
Decisions Issued:
in favor of consumers
in favor of manufacturers..
906
669(74%)
379
370
176(48%)
194(52%)
Total Dispositions: 644 (includes decisions, settlements
and withdrawals)
Total Cash Awards: 164
amount: $4,831,095
average award: $ 29,458
Total Replacement Awards: 12 $ 353,496
Total Settlements: 191 $5,455,347
-----------------
Total Recoveries: ............................... $10,639,938
Combining awards and settlements, consumers prevailed in 65.4% of all cases (367 out of
561 dispositions excluding withdrawals).
1
SEVENTEEN YEAR SUMMARY
1987- 2003
Applications Received: 24,316
Applications Accepted: 17,832 (73%)
Hearings Scheduled: 11,843
Decisions Issued: 10,650
in favor of consumers........... 5,652(53%)
in favor of manufacturers.... 4,998(47%)
Total Dispositions: 17,404 (includes decisions, settlements
Total Cash Awards: 5,224
and withdrawals)
amount: $100,735,242
average award: $19,283
Total Replacement Awards: 428 $ 7,765,992
Total Settlements: 4,619 $ 76,221,441
--------------------
Total Recoveries: .......................................... $184,722,675
Combining awards and settlements, consumers prevailed in 67% of all cases (10,271 out of
15,269 dispositions excluding withdrawals).


INTRODUCTION
This is the seventeenth annual report of the New York State New Car Lemon Law
Arbitration Program ("Program") which covers new car purchases and leases as well as new motor
homes. This report demonstrates that the Program is continuing to provide New York consumers with
a speedy and effective forum to present and resolve lemon law grievances. For example, over the past
year, approximately six out of every ten consumers who went through the program either received a
favorable decision or agreed to a settlement of their dispute.
This past year marked the Program's seventh full year with the New York State
Dispute Resolution Association ("NYSDRA") as Program Administrator. (The NYSDRA replaced the
American Arbitration Association on November 1, 1996. It was reappointed for a two-year term
beginning November 1, 2002.) The NYSDRA is an umbrella organization consisting of Community Dispute
Resolution Centers in almost every county in the State. As a result, consumers now have the
opportunity to choose from fifty nine hearing-site locations throughout the State, an expansion over the
fifteen original regional locations that were available for lemon law hearings prior to November
1996.'
 

The 59 current site options are:
Albany Amsterdam Auburn Batavia Binghamton Bronx Brooklyn Buffalo Canandaigua Carmel Catskill Cobleskill
Corning Cortland Delhi Elmira Fort Edward Geneseo Glens Falls Goshen Hempstead Highland Hudson Ilion
Ithaca Jamaica Jamestown Johnstown Lake Placid Lower Manh.Lowville Lyons Malone Monticello Montour Falls NewCity
Niagara Falls Norwich Ogdensburg Olean Oneida Oneonta Oswego Penn Yan Plattsburgh Poughkeepsie Rochester Saratoga Springs
Schenectady Smithtown Speculator Staten Island Syracuse Troy Upper Manh. Utica Waterloo Watertown Yonkers
 

Consequently, comparison statistics given in this report incorporating regional data for the period prior to
November, 1996, will not necessarily reflect the same locations as those for after that date. For example,
instead of the present "Hauppauge" and "Hempstead" entries for Long Island, the pre-1996 Long Island
locations were designated as "Suffolk" and "Nassau," respectively, and hearings were held at other locations within
those counties.

The Program continues to maintain its position as the nation's preeminent lemon law
arbitration program. In 2003, 906 applications were processed and awards and settlements totaled in
excess of $10.6 million. Since its inception in February 1987, 24,316 applications have been
processed, yielding over $184.7 million in awards and settlements for consumers.
The Lemon Law -A Summary
The New Car Lemon Law (General Business Law §198-a) provides a legal remedy for
consumers who are buyers or lessees of new cars that turn out to be lemons. If the car does not
conform to the terms of the written warranty and the manufacturer or its authorized dealer is unable to
repair the car after a reasonable number of attempts during the first 18,000 miles or two years, whichever
comes first, the consumer can choose a full refund or a comparable replacement car. The law covers
both new and used cars, including "demos," which satisfy the following four conditions:
1. The car was covered by the manufacturer's new car warranty at the time of original
delivery; and
2. The car was purchased, leased or transferred within the earlier of the first 18,000
miles or two years from the date of original delivery; and
3. The car either: (a) was purchased, leased or transferred in New York, or (b) is
presently registered in New York; and
4. The car is primarily used for personal purposes.
It is presumed that there have been a reasonable number of attempts to repair a
problem if, during the first 18,000 miles of operation or two years from the original delivery date,
whichever comes first, either: (1) the same problem has been subject to repair four or more times and the
problem continued to exist after the fourth attempt; or (2) the car is out of service by reason of repair of one
or more problems for a cumulative total of 30 or more calendar days.

A consumer has the choice of either participating in an arbitration program or suing the
manufacturer directly in court. Any action under the lemon law must be commenced within four years of
the date of original delivery. Consumers may participate in the Program established pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General under the lemon law. Decisions under the Program are
binding on both parties.
 

Statistical Analysis
I. Applications
A. Submission of Applications
In 2003, 906 consumers statewide submitted "Request-for-Arbitration" forms to the Attorney
General's Office. The cumulative total for the seventeen year period (1987-2003) was 24,316. The two
locations with the highest number of applications were both in Long Island: Smithtown and
Hempstead, with 14% and 13% of the total (with 123 and 114), respectively. The next busiest
location was Buffalo with 67 (7% of the total) applications submitted, followed by Yonkers with 56 (6%).
Chart 1 below reflects the distribution of applications received by region for 2003 as well as the
cumulative total for the seventeen years of the Program.
5
Chart 1
Applications Received, by Region 2003
1987 -2003
Totals Received % Totals Received ----------------------
(deleted)

B. Review by the Attorney General's Office
Of the 906 applications submitted to and reviewed by the Attorney General's Office in 2003, 490
were initially accepted and 301 were rejected. Of the 301 that were initially rejected, 64 were
resubmitted and were accepted after the consumer was able to cure the reason for the rejection. Thus,
three out of every four, or a total of 669 (74%) applications were accepted for arbitration and 237 (26%)
were rejected as not qualifying for the Program. Chart 2 depicts this activity for the last five years,
1998-2003, and the totals for the seventeen years of the Program's existence.

Chart 2
Attorney General's Review
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 All Yrs
Accepted 554 567 512 556 669 17,832
Rejected 240 255 274 208 237 6,484
Total 794 822 786 764 906 24,316
As in the previous years of operation, the most common reason for rejection was the
consumer's failure to allege four or more repair attempts for the same defect (141 or 59% of the 237 that
were ultimately rejected).
C. Applications "Filed"
The Administrator has reported that in 2003 there were 479 applications "filed" (those for
which the Administrator received the filing fee from the consumer) under the Program .2 For the
period 1987-2003, there were 15,279 applications filed with the Administrator.
 

II. Time Between Filing Date and Hearing
The average time span in 2003 between the filing date (the date when the filing fee is received by the Administrator)
and the date of the arbitration hearing was 40 days, a decrease of one day over the previous year. Although the
regulations call for 35 days between the filing date and the hearing.

A number of the applications accepted into the Program in 2003 were not (yet) "filed" in 2003 or were
withdrawn as a result of settlements negotiated between the parties prior to the arbitration process. This
accounts for the difference in the number of cases accepted (669) and those "filed" (479).
hearing, an allowance is made if either party or the arbitrator requests an adjournment or additional time
to obtain further documentation or to reasonably accommodate the schedules of the parties.

Ill. Hearings
In 2003, 379 arbitration hearings were scheduled; 86% (326) were oral and 14% (53) were on
documents only.' Hempstead and Smithtown were the busiest location sites with 52 and 51
hearings, representing 14% and 13%, respectively, of the total hearings scheduled. Since the
inception of the Program seventeen years ago, there were a total of 11,843 hearings scheduled, with
Nassau County (Hempstead) the single busiest region with nearly 22% of all hearings (2,602)
followed by New York City (Manhattan) where 2,057 (17%) hearings were conducted.
 

IV. Dispositions
The three ways a Program case may be disposed of are through: (1) an arbitrator's decision; (2)
a settlement between the parties; or (3) a consumer's withdrawal of the claim. In 2003 there were 644
disposition s.4 For the seventeen years the Program has been in operation, there have been 17,404
dispositions.

These statistics are based on the requests made in the application forms but do not represent the
breakdown of the actual hearings conducted. Subsequent to the filing of the application forms, the parties may
agree to change from a "documents only" hearing to an oral hearing.

The difference between the total number of cases concluded (644) and the number of cases "filed" (479),
results from the fact that: (a) some cases although filed in 2003 were not concluded in 2003, and (b) some cases
were concluded after being accepted into the Program but before "filing" (e.g. withdrawn or settled).

A. Arbitration Awards
In 2003, there were 370 arbitrator awards. Of these, 176 (48%) were in favor of the
consumer and 194 (52%) were for the manufacturer. For the fourth year in a row, there were more awards
issued in favor of the manufacturer than there were for the consumer. Of the 176 decisions in favor of the
consumer, 164 were for a full cash refund and 12 were for a replacement vehicle. Chart 3 below
compares the award statistics for the last eight years (1995-2002) and the totals for the full seventeen-year
period, 1987-2003.
Chart 3
Eight-Year Comparison of Award Statistics
and for Total 1987-2003 Period

Percent
1996 380 156 10 166 214 44% 56%
1997 363 168 10 178 185 49% 51%
1998 357 171 10 181 176 51% 49%
1999 337 171 19 190 147 56% 44%
2000 303 137 12 149 154 49% 51%
2001 303 138 5 143 160 47% 53%
2002 329 127 8 135 194 41% 59%
2003 370 164 12 176 194 48% 52%
17-Yrs. 10,650 5,272 380 5,652 4,998 53% 47%
Chart 4 below shows the breakdown of decisions rendered in 2003 in each region.
Immediately following is Chart 5 which indicates the respective percentages of the awards in favor of the
consumer (cash + replacement awards) and the manufacturer, for each region.
10
Cha r t 4
Awards, by Region - 2003
Region
ALBANY
Cash

Chart 5
Percentage of 2003 Awards in Favor of
Consumer and Manufacturer (by Region)
Region
# of
Awards
% for
Consumer
% for
Mfr
All Regions 370 48 52
ALBANY 14 50 50
AMSTERDAM 1 100 0
BATAVIA 6 33 67
BINGHAMTON 5 40 60
BRONX 21 43 57
BROOKLYN 24 50 50
BUFFALO 31 32 68
CANANDAIGUA 2 0 100
CARMEL 8 75 25
CATSKILL 0 0 0
CORNING 5 80 20
CORTLAND 1 0 100
DELHI 1 100 0
ELMIRA 3 33 67
GENESEO 0 0 0
GENEVA 0 0 0
GLENS FALLS 3 33 67
GOSHEN 5 80 20
HEMPSTEAD 51 47 53
HUDSON 1 100 0
ILION 1 100 0
ITHACA 1 100 0
JAMAICA 15 47 53
JOHNSTOWN 0 0 0
LOWER MANHATTA 13 23 77
LOWVILLE 0 0 0
MALONE 2 100 0
MONTICELLO 5 40 60
NEW CITY 10 30 70
NIAGARA FALLS 3 0 100
NORWICH 0 0 0
OLEAN 0 0 0
ONEIDA 1 0 100
OSWEGO 2 100 0
PLATTSBURGH 0 0 0
POUGHKEEPSIE 15 40 60
ROCHESTER 10 30 70
SARATOGA SPRING 4 25 75
SCHENECTADY 2 50 50
SMITHTOWN 47 55 45
STATEN ISLAND 11 55 45
SYRACUSE 10 40 60
12
Chart 5
Percentage of 2003 Awards in Favor of Consumer and Manufacturer (by
Region)
Region
# of
Awards
% for
Consumer
% for
Mfr
All Regions 370 48 52
TROY 4 50 50
UPPER MANHATTAN 3 0 100
UTICA 3 67 33
WATERTOWN 2 50 50
YONKERS 24 75 25
 

(1) Cash Refund Awards
The total amount of the 164 cash awards was $4,831,095, representing an average recovery of
$29,458 per award. For the seventeen year period, there were 5,224 cash awards totaling
$100,735,242 -- an average of $19,283 per award.
(2) Manufacturers' Scorecard
Chart 6 below shows the distribution, by manufacturer, of the 2003 awards, indicating those for
cash, for replacement cars, for the manufacturer and the total number of such awards.
13
Chart 6
2003 Awards (by Manufacturer)
Mfr Cash Mfr Repl
Cash
Replacement
Total
 

AM GENERAL 0 0 0 0 0
AUDI 0 2 0 0 2
BMW 2 0 0 0 2
CHRYSLER 24 51 0 0 75
DAMON 1 0 0 0 1
FLEETWOOD 0 1 0 0 1
FORD 49 17 0 6 72
FREIGHTLINER 0 0 0 0 0
GEORGIE BOY 1 0 0 0 1
GM 20 65 0 2 87
GULFSTREAM 1 0 0 0 1
HONDA 7 11 0 1 19
HYUNDAI 7 4 0 0 11
INFINITI 1 1 0 0 2
ISUZU 0 0 0 0 0
JAGUAR 4 0 0 0 4
KIA 4 3 0 0 7
LAND ROVER 0 1 0 0 1
LEXUS 0 0 0 0 0
MASERATI 0 0 0 0 0
MAZDA 3 2 0 0 5
MERCEDES 2 3 0 0 5
MITSUBISHI 1 0 0 0 1
MONACO 0 0 0 0 0
NEWMAR 0 0 0 0 0
NISSAN 10 7 0 2 19
PORSCHE 1 1 0 0 2
R-VISION 1 0 0 0 1
RANGE ROVER 0 1 0 0 1
REXHALL 0 1 0 0 1
SAAB 0 1 0 0 1
SUBARU 4 2 0 0 6
SUZUKI 2 1 0 0 3
TOYOTA 9 11 0 0 20
TRAVELSUPRE 0 1 0 0 1
VOLVO 0 0 0 0 0
VW 10 7 0 1 18
WESTERN RV 0 0 0 0 0
Total 164 194 0 12 370
 

Chart 7 below shows the cash awards, including the number of such awards, the total dollar
amount refunded and the average award, issued against each manufacturer in
2003. 14
Chart 7
2003 Cash Awards, by Manufacturer
Mfr Total $ No. Average
BMW $171,102 2 $85,551
CHRYSLER $626,671 24 $26,111
DAMON $85,910 1 $85,910
FORD $1,478,788 49 $30,179
GEORGIE BOY $71,144 1 $71,144
GM $574,501 20 $28,725
GULFSTREAM $66,448 1 $66,448
HONDA $157,768 7 $22,538
HYUNDAI $120,243 7 $17,178
INFINITI $26,154 1 $26,154
JAGUAR $163,945 4 $40,986
KIA $58,826 4 $14,707
MAZDA $52,314 3 $17,438
MERCEDES $107,737 2 $53,869
MITSUBISHI $30,442 1 $30,442
NISSAN $231,260 10 $23,126
PORSCHE $93,736 1 $93,736
R-VISION $73,432 1 $73,432
SUBARU $113,715 4 $28,429
SUZUKI $40,252 2 $20,126
TOYOTA $233,499 9 $25,944
VW $253,208 10 $25,321
All $4,831,095 164 $29,458
A cumulative summary of the cash awards, presented by manufacturer, for the full seventeen
year period (1987-2003) is set forth below in Chart 8.
15
16
Chart 8
1987-2003 Summary of Cash Awards (by Manufacturer)
Total $ Mfr
ALFA ROMEO 382,058
No.
18
Average $
21,225
AMC 783,546 54 14,510
AUDI 786,410 30 26,214
AUSTIN ROVER 240,468 10 24,047
BITTER 35,205 1 35,205
BMW 1,242.571 27 46,021
CHRYSLER 17,608,315 971 18,134
COACHMEN 79,470 1 79,470
DAEWOO 53,506 4 13,377
DAMON 143,401 2 71,701
EXCALIBER 75,178 75,178
FIAT 77,033 7 11,005
FLEETWOOD 428,278 8 53,535
FORD 26,224,827 1361 19,269
GEORGIE BOY 142,317 2 71,159
GM 28,862,027 1642 17,577
GULFSTREAM 66,448 1 66,448
HONDA 1,152,520 60 19,209
HYUNDAI 1,233, 714 101 12,215
INFINITI 109,094 4 27,274
SUZU 923,456 52 17,759
JAGUAR 1.787,110 38 47,029
KIA 916,058 59 15,526
LEXUS 316,944 6 52,824
MASERATI 27,084 1 27,084
MAZDA 1,235,490 69 17,906
MERCEDES 1,236,485 23 53,760
MITSUBISHI 1,300,466 68 19,125
MONACO 556,832 3 185,611
NEWMAR 125,496 1 125,496
NISSAN 2,975,432 165 18,033
PEUGEOT 256,520 13 19,732
PORSCHE 964,594 19 50,768
R-VISION 73,432 1 73,432
RANGE ROVER 165,967 3 55,322
ROLLS ROYCE 95,652 1 95,652
SAAB 871,356 35 24,896
SAFARI 362,213 3 120,738
SATURN 18,891 1 18,891
SUBARU 912,178 53 17,211
SUZUKI 364,574 23 15,851
TIFFIN MOTOR HOMES 262,046 2 131,023
TOYOTA 2.363,691 115 20,554
TVR 16,733 1 16,733
VOLVO 795,552 27 29,465
VW 1,661,730 94 17,678
WINNEBAGO 191,154 3 63,718
YUGO 231,720 40 5.793
All $100,735,242 5,224 $19,283
 

(3) Vehicle Replacement Awards
In 2003 there were a total of 12 replacement awards. The estimated total value of the 12
replacement awards is $353,496 (the average cash award of $29,458 x 12).
The combined amount refunded to consumers in 2003 as a result of all arbitration awards
issued in favor of the consumer (cash + replacement awards) was $5,184,591.
For the seventeen year Program operation period ending December 31, 2003 there were 428
replacement awards, of which 48 were converted to cash awards. The total estimated recovery for the
replacement awards over the seventeen years is $7,765,992 ($7,327,540 plus $438,452 from the 48 that
were converted to cash).5
 

(4) Awards Involving Leased Cars
In 2003, a total of 65 decisions (nearly 18% of the total decisions) involved leased cars, 55% of
which were decided in favor of the consumer/lessee and 45% in favor of the manufacturer. The total
amount refunded in the 34 cases in which the consumer/lessee won a cash award was
$1,303,854.6 Over the life of the Program, there were a total of 1,415 decisions involving leased
vehicles of which a little more than half (721) were decided in favor of the consumer/lessee,
translating to almost $18 million in refunds.
B. Settlements
The Program also served as a significant catalyst in generating 191 settlements in 2003,
representing approximately one third of the total 561 dispositions (excluding withdrawals). Over the
5
The seventeen year average cash award of $19,283 x 380 replacement awards.
6
This figure includes both the portion of the refund that goes to the consumer/lessee and the
portion of the refund that goes to the lessor.
17
seventeen years of the Program, there were a total of 4,619 settlements.
To ascertain the nature of the settlements, a mail survey was conducted by the Attorney
General's Office. Of the 191 settlements, information was obtained for 134 or 70% of the total number of
settlements. From that information we were able to determine the nature of the settlements as indicated
in Chart 9 below.
Chart 9
2002 Settlement Survey
Claims Percent
Replacement 55 28.8%
Cash 70 36.7%
Repair 9 4.7%
Unknown 57 29.8%
All 191 100%
The 70 settled cases in which a cash refund was received total $2,145,363 (an average of
$30,648 per case). In addition, as a result of the 55 settlements in which replacement vehicles were
offered, we can estimate that an additional $1,685,640 (55 x $30,648) was refunded to consumers, for a
total recovery for all known settlements (excluding repairs) of $3,831,003.
Thus, 93% of the consumers responding to the survey indicated that their settlements were either
a cash refund or a replacement car. Assuming the same breakdown of recoveries for the remaining
57 settlement cases for which no information was received as those for which we did
receive information from consumers, we can reasonably project that an additional 53 consumers
received either a cash refund or a replacement car. Based on the average settlement cash recovery to
consumers of $30,648, the amount recovered by these 53 consumers may be estimated to be
18
19
$1,624,344. Thus, adding the figures f oral I settlements, excluding those for repairs. the total recovery to
consumers in 2003 may be estimated to be $5,455,347.
For the seventeen year period 1987-2003, the breakdown of the responses to our telephone and
mail surveys is depicted in Chart 10 below. The total number of settlements over that period was 4,619.
Based on the average cash settlement for that period of $18,318, the total recovery for settlements
can be estimated to be $76,221,441.'
Chart 10
1987-2002 Settlement Survey
Claims Percent
Replacement 2,199 47.6%
Cash 1,103 23.9%
Repair 363 7.9%
Unknown 954 20.6%
All 4,619 100%
Chart 11, below, depicts the number of settlements concluded by each manufacturer in 2002.
' 1,103 actual cash settlements = $ 20,204,997
2,199 replacements x $18,318 = $ 40,281,282
954 unknown (90% cash or replacement, 859 x $18,318) _ $ 15,735,162
------------------
$ 76,221,441
Chart 11
2003 Settlements
AM GENERAL 1
AUDI 2
BMW 14
CHRYSLER 37
DAMON 0
FLEETWOOD 0
FORD 22
FREIGHTLINER 0
GEORGIE BOY 0
GM 43
GULFSTREAM 0
HONDA 14
HYUNDAI 4
INFINITI 0
SUZU 1
JAGUAR 2
KIA 4
LAND ROVER 2
LEXUS 3
MASERATI 1
MAZDA 3
MERCEDES 13
MITSUBISHI 2
MONACO 2
NEWMAR 0
NISSAN 4
PORSCHE 0
R-VISION 0
RANGE ROVER
REXHALL 0
SAAB 0
SUBARU 2
SUZUKI 0
TOYOTA 0
TRAVELSUPRE 0
VOLVO 3
VW 10
WESTERN RV 1
C. Withdrawals
In 2003 a total of 83 cases were withdrawn either before or after payment of the filing fee.
Such cases include those of consumers who may have settled before a hearing oreven before paying a filing
fee, those found to be ineligible based on facts determined after the application process, or those whose
cars were stolen, involved in an accident, or repossessed.
20
D. Total Dispositions
Combining all 2003 Program dispositions, Chart 12 on the following page depicts the Program's
activity for the past year.
E. 2003 Total Recovery
The total recovery to consumers under the Program in 2003, including cash awards
($4,831,095), replacements ($353,496) and settlements ($5,455,347), was $10,639,938.
F. Seventeen Year Grand Total Recoveries: 1987-2003
Since the Program's inception in 1987, the aggregate total of the 5,224 cash awards is
$100,735,242. The total estimated value of the 428 replacement awards is $7,765,992 and the total value
of the 4,619 settlements that resulted from the Program is $76,221,441. Thus, the estimated grand total
for all recoveries under the Program since its inception in 1987 is $184,722,675.
V. Time Between Filing Date and Decision
The average number of days between the filing date and the date of issuance of the decision was
57.8 Although this is longer than the 45 days called for by the regulations, in many cases the delays were
necessitated because the arbitrator, or one or both of the parties, requested additional time to secure
further documentation or to reach a settlement.
8
Pursuant to the regulations, the official "date of issuance" of the decision is the date on which the
decision is mailed by the Administrator to the parties.
21
Chart 12
Total 2003 Dispositions--By Manufacturer
Manufact Mfr Cash Replacement Settle Replace Withdrawn Settle Fix Settle Settle Cash Total
 

AM GENERAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
AUDI 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 5
BMW 0 2 0 2 2 8 3 16
CHRYSLER 51 24 0 8 17 6 22 129
DAMON 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
FLEETWOOD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
FORD 17 49 6 11 7 6 4 101
FREIGHTLINER 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
GEORGIE BOY o 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
GM 65 20 2 5 21 2 4 32 151
GULFSTREAM 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
HONDA 11 7 8 5 0 6 0 38
HYUNDAI 4 7 0 1 6 0 3 0 21
INFINITI 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
SUZU 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
JAGUAR 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 6
KIA 3 4 0 3 2 0 1 0
LAND ROVER 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3
LEXUS 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
MASERATI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
MAZDA 2 3 0 0 1 2 1 0 9
MERCEDES 3 2 0 3 1 0 8 2
MITSUBISHI 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3
MONACO 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0
NEWMAR 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
NISSAN 7 10 2 3 3 0 0 26
PORSCHE 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
R-VISION 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
RANGE ROVER 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
REXHALL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAAB 0 a 0 0 0 0 0
SUBARU 2 4 0 0 0 2 0 9
SUZUKI 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
TOYOTA 9 0 0 6 0 0 0 26
TRAVEL SUPREME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
VOLVO 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3
VW 7 10 5 3 0 3 2 31
WESTERN RV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 194 164 55 83 9 57 70 644
22
VI. Time Between Hearing and Decision
The average number of days between the hearing date and the date of the issuance of the
decision was 17.9 In some instances there were delays beyond the 10 days called for by the
regulations as a result of requests from arbitrators for the production of further documentation,
especially in the cases involving leased vehicles, or as a result of corrections required in the award.
VII. Manufacturers' Compliance with Awards
To determine the extent of the manufacturers' compliance with the Program's arbitration
awards, the Attorney General's Office conducts a statewide mail survey of all consumers who receive a
favorable award or settlement, usually after 60 days from the date the award is issued." The results of the
survey indicated that 117 consumers (63% of those responding) received their refund check or
replacement cars within 30 days of the issuance of the decision or settlement; another 33 (18% of those
responding) received their relief within 31-45 days from the issuance of the awards. Thus, a total of
81% of those responding received their relief within 45 days of the decision. Another 25 consumers
(13.5% of those responding) received their relief after 45 days." Those that experienced delays indicated
that, in most cases, the cause for the delay in compliance was due to either the manufacturer's
seeking to modify the decision or the consumer's waiting for a special order replacement car.
Chart 13 below reflects the results of the compliance survey.
9 See previous footnote.
10
Generally, compliance questionnaires are mailed each month to consumers whose awards or
settlements were issued at least sixty days earlier. Follow-up questionnaires are mailed the next month if no
response or a negative response was received to the original mailing.
Although the statistics reflecta 95% compliance rate by manufacturers for those consumers who
responded and who received a favorable decision or settlement, it has been our experience that
eventually there is essentially 100% compliance by the manufacturers. (The only exception is during the
pendency of any litigation relating to the award.)
23
Chart 13
2002 Compliance Survey
Within 30 days 117 63.3
31-45 days 33 17.8%
After 45 days 25 13.5%
No compliance 10 5.4%
Totals 185 100%
Legislative Activity
In 2003, the New Car Lemon Law was amended (Laws of 2003, Chapter 485) to include
motorcycles within its coverage. The law will become effective September 1, 2004, covering
motorcycles sold after that date.
24
APPENDIX
Cumulative List of Decisions Relating to the New Car Lemon Law .................
2003 Decisions ...........................................................................................

DaimIerChrvsler Corp. v. Arhakis, No 0109740/2003 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County, July 25, 2003)(Edmead, J.)
General Motors Corp. v. Jacobs, No. 5636/2003 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County, Sep. 26, 2003)(Malone, J.)
Hyundai Motor America v. Northshield, No. 7882/03 (Sup. Ct.
West. County, Aug. 5, 2003)(Nastasi, J.)
Kucher v. DaimlerChrvsler Corp., No. 712 QTS 2002 (Civ. Ct.
Queens County, Feb. 4, 2003)(Elliot, J.)
Marzullo v. General Motors Corp., No. 001993/2001 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County, Feb. 7, 2003)(Pagones, J.)
25
Cumulative List of New Car Lemon Law Cases
Alfa Romeo V. BMW, Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Oct. 28, 1988.
American Motors Sales Corp.v. Brown, 152 A.D.2d 343, 548 N.Y.S.2d 791 (2d Dept. 1989);
leave to appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 709 (1990).
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Carbona, No. 18776-88 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, Jan. 11,
1988)(Colby, J).
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Cohen, No. 6266/88 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, June 15, 1988)
(Aronin, J.).
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Lapidus, No. 12894/87 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, Nov.
12,1987) (Natasi, J.); aff'd 156 A.D.2d 517, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 801 (2d Dept. 1989); appeal denied,
75 N.Y.2d 709 (1990).
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Ponessa, No. 16340/87 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, March 14,
1988) (Gurahian, J.).
American Motor Sales Corp. v. Simpel, No. 16937/87 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, Dec. 18,
1987) (Wood, J.).
Bailey v. Ford, 135 Misc. 2d 901, 516 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1987).
Birnbaum v. Ford, 182 A.D.2d 524, 583 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dept. 1992). Borys v. Scarsdale
Ford, Sup. Ct. Westchester County, June 15, 1998 (Dickerson, J.). Brandt v. Monaco Coach
Corp., 269 A.D.2d 671, 702 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2000). Chrysler v. Bushansky, Sup. Ct.
Nassau County, Jan. 26, 1989. Chrysler v. James, Sup. Ct. Queens County, Nov. 14, 1988.
Chrysler v. Schachner, 138 Misc. 2d 501, 525 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1988); re'd
166 A.D.2d 683, 561 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dept. 1990).
Clark v. Chrysler Motors, No. 27638/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, June 22, 1990)(Shainswit, J.).
Conlan v. GM, 137 Misc. 2d 244, 520 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1987).
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Arhakis, No. 0109740/03 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, July 25,
2003)(Edmead, J.)
Dalto v. Porsche, No. 9351/88 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, Sept. 12, 1988) (Roberto, J.); motion to
confirm award granted Sept 18, 1989.
26
Daniel v. GMC, 269 A.D.2d 337, 703 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dept. 2000).
Dawson v. GM, 158 A.D.2d 756, 551 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dept. 1990).
DiFusco v. Clover Leasinq, 188 A.D.2d 439, 592 N.Y.S.2d 589(1 st Dept. 1992); leave to appeal
denied, 81 N.Y.2d 709 (1992).
Dow v. GM, Sup. Ct. Nassau County, April 18, 1989.
Fabrizio v. Ford, Sup. Ct. Onondaga County Dec. 30, 1987 (Murphy, J.); aff'd 145 A.D.2d 1004,
538 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dept. 1988); leave to appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 649 (1989).
Fahy v. GM & Wheelease, No. 1653/88 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, July 15, 1988)(McCabe, J.). GM
v. Cotton, No. 7096/87 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, June 19, 1987)(Marbach, J.). GM v.
Difede, No. 7673/89 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, Aug. 2, 1989)(O'Shaughnessy, J.). GM Corp. v.
Ettl, No. 25168/99 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, Dec. 13, 1999)(Franco, J.). GM v. Fischer, 140 Misc.
2d 243, 530 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1988). GM v. Jacobs, No. 5636/03 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County, Sep. 26, 2003)(Malone, J.) GM v. Lauri, No. 3469/89 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County,
April 17, 1989)(Collins, J.). GM v. Lee, 193 A.D.2d 741, 598 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dept. 1993).
GM v. Liquori, (Sup. Ct. Greene County, July 2, 1998)(Cobb, J.).
GM v. Major, No. 1862/96 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, May 14, 1996)(Burke, J.). GM v.
Mistretta, No. 0535/99 (Sup. Ct. Broome County, April 16, 1999)(Rose, J.).
GM v. Renjifo, 162 Misc. 2d 369, 616 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, 1994); aff'd, 224
A.D.2d 693, 638 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2d Dept 1996).
GM v. Smaller, 142 Misc. 2d 497, 537 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1988). GM
v. Tauber, No. 3016/00 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County, Oct. 4, 2000) (Bergerman, J.).
Grinaldo v. Tiffin Motor, No. 196458/99 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County, June 24, 1999) (Canfield, J.).
Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. v. Disanto, 173 Misc. 2d 242, 661 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. St.
Lawrence County 1997).
27
Homer v. Ford, No. 62427/88 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County, Aug. 11, 1988)(Bergin, J.).
Hynson v. American Motor Sales, No. 1713/88 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, June 14, 1988)
(Saladino, J.), aff'd, 164 A.D.2d 41, 561 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dept. 1990).
Hyundai Motor America v. Northshield, No. 7882/03 (Sup. Ct. West. County, Aug. 5,
2003)(Nastasi, J.)
lanotti v. Safari, 225 A.D.2d 848, 638 N.Y.S.2d 992 (3d Dept. 1996).
Jarvis v. Safari, 248 A.D.2d 848. 670 N.Y.S.2d 927 (3d Dept. 1998).
Kelty v. GM, Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Jan. 26, 1988.
Kornblatt v. Jaguar, 172 A.D.2d 590, 568 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2d Dept. 1991).
Kucher v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 712 QTS 2002 (Civ. Ct. Queens County, Feb 4,
2003)(Elliot, J.)
Luciano v. Worldwide VW, 127 A.D.2d 1, 514 N.Y.S.2d 140 (3d Dept. 1987).
Lveth v. Chrysler, 734 F. Supp 86 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); modified, 929 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1991).
Marzullo v. GM Corp., No. 001993/2001 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County, Feb. 7, 2003)(Pagones, J.)
Maxwell v. Crabtree Ford, 144 Misc. 2d 95, 543 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1989).
Mercedes v. Yoon, Sup. Ct. New York County, March 18, 1994 (Lebedeff, J.).
Mercedes v. Papadakis, No. 7592/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, July 14, 1989) (Weissberg, J.).
Miller v. Chrysler, 88 Civ-585 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (McAvoy, J.); remanded, (Sup.Ct. Albany County
1989).
Miller v. Crabtree Mazda, 146 Misc. 2d 658, 552 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1990).
Oberly v. Mercedes Benz, No. 0537-98 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County, April 22, 1998)(Murphy, J.).
Parlato v. Chrysler, 170 A.D.2d 442, 565 N.Y.S.2d 230 (2d Dept. 1991).
Peak v. Northway Travel Trailers, 260 AD.2d 840, 683 N.Y.S. 2d 738 (3d Dept. 1999).
Porsche v. Ploof, No. 6234/90 (Sup. Ct. Albany County, June 19, 1991) (Kahn, J.).
28
Putter v. Jaguar, No. 14488/89 (Sup.Ct.Bronx County, July 12, 1990)(Katz, J.).
Safari v. Corwin, 162 Misc.2d 449, 617 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County,1994); affd,
225 A.D.2d 921, 638 N.Y.S.2d 992 (3d Dept 1996).
Saturn v. Hurlburt, 284 A.D.2d 399, 725 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dept, June 11, 2001)
Scolza v. GMC Truck, No. 21702/89 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, May 10, 1990)(Segal, J.).
Scorzari v. Ford, No. 7121/92 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, Aug. 21, 1992)(Lama, J.).
Sepulveda v. American Motor Sales Corp., 137 Misc.2d 543, 521 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1987).
Subaru of America v. Brueck, No. 98-135 (Sup. Ct. Schoharie County, Aug. 17, 1998)
(Hughes, J.).
Subaru v. McKelvey, 141 Misc. 2d 41, 532 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1988).
Titus v. Rolls Royce, 174 A.D.2d 322, 570 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dept. 1991).
Toyota v. Gifford, No. 26391/90 (Sup. Ct. Clinton County, June 29, 1990) (Plumadore, J.).
Verdier v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 255 A.D.2d 436, 680 N.Y.S.2d 596 (2d Dept.
1998).
Volkswagen v. Abrams et al., Sup. Ct. Broome County, Nov. 23, 1988 (Smyk, J.). Volkswagen
v. Bender, No. 17568/87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, July 15, 1988) (McCabe, J.).
Volkswagen v. Braunstein, No. 23079/87 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, June 16, 1988)
(Natasi, J.).
Volkswagen v. Friedman, No. 21481/87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, July 15, 1988) (McCabe, J);
aff'd, 166 A.D.2d 709, 561 N.Y.S.2d 597 (2d Dept. 1990).
Volkswagen v. Panico, No. 17953/87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, July 15, 1988) (McCabe, J.).
Volkswagen v. Santoni, No. 20061/87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1988) (Murphy, J.).
Volkswagen v. Steinbach, No. 17570/87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, July 15, 1988) (McCabe, J.).
Volkswagen v. Zadanosky, No. 17954/87 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, July 15, 1988) (McCabe, J.).
Volvo v. Depaola, No. 21079/87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988) (Wright, J.); modified 156 A.D.2d
29
40, 554 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1st Dept. 1990).
Walker v. GM, 159 Misc. 2d 651, 606 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1993) (Gans, J);
motion to reargue granted, 160 Misc. 2d 903, 611 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1994).
Yeqelwel v. Jaquar Cars, 147 Misc. 2d 662, 558 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1990).
30
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF New York - New York COUNTY
The following papers, numbered 1 to_________ were read on this motion to/for  PAPERS
NUMBERED
1-'Id
i3
Cross-Motion: ~J Yes E No
Upon the foregoing papers, It is ordered that this motion
Based on the accompanying memorandum decision, it is hereby
ORDERED that the petition by DaimlerChrysler Corp. to vacate an
arbitration award in favor of respondents Konstantinos and Maria Arhakis, dated
February 10, 2003 and remand the matter for rehearing before a
different arbitrator, is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the Arbitrator's Award in favor of respondents
Konstantinos and Maria Arhakis (the "Arhakises") dated February 10, 2003 for a
consumer refund, is vacated; and it is further
ORDERED, that the matter is remanded for rehearing before a
different arbitrator.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
PRESENT: HON. CAROL EDMEAD
0109740/2003
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP.
ARHAKIS, KONSTANTINOS & MARIA
PART 3.C
SEQ 1
VACATE OR MODIFY AWARD
INDEX NO. MOTION
DATE MOTION SEQ.
NO. MOTION CAL.
NO.0 3'

Notice of Motion/ Order to Show Cause - Affidavits - Exhibits ...
Answering Affidavits - Exhibits
Replying Affidavits
Dated: 7/ 2-r /c 3 _________
HON. CAKOt~~MEAs.c.
Check one: FINAL DISPOSITION 0 NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: PART 35
x
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP.,
Petitioners,
-against
ARHAKIS, KONSTANTINOS & MARIA,
Respondents.
----------------------------------
HON. CAROL R. EDNEAD, J.S.C.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
In this Article 75 proceeding, petitioner DaimlerChrysler
Corp. ("DaimlerChrysler")' seeks to vacate an arbitration award,
issued pursuant to Lemon Law, ordering DaimlerChrysler to refund
the purchase price of a van to buyer. DaimlerChrysler seeks an
order pursuant to CPLR § 7511 vacating the Arbitrator's Award in
"Arhakises") dated February 10, 2003 (the "Award°) for a consumer refund, and
remanding the matter for rehearing before a different arbitrator.
DaimlerChrysler contends that the decision is arbitrary and
capricious in that the arbitrator wholly failed to decide the
threshold issue in dispute, that is, whether the alleged problem of which
the Arhakises complained (idle dip and surge) was
a defect or a normal design characteristic.
The Arhakises cross move for an order confirming said Award
'DaimlerChrysler is a foreign corporation duly authorized to transact
business in the State of New York. DaimlerChrysler is also the
manufacturer of the 2002 Jeep Grand Cherokee, the vehicle model at issue
herein.
Index No. 109740/03
favor of respondents Konstantinos and Maria Arhakis (the
and seek reasonable attorneys' fees for the defense of this
frivolous application. The Arhakises contend that the Arbitrator
made a reasoned decision based on the substantial findings
presented at the proceedings.
Facts
Prior to December 18, 2001, DaimlerChrysler manufactured and sold to
Bayside Chrysler Jeep, Inc. ("Bayside"), a certain 2002 Jeep Grand
Cherokee, vehicle identification number 1J4GW58N32C151341 (the
'Jeep"). Pursuant to a contract dated
delivery of the Jeep. The Jeep was warranted by
DaimlerChrysler
provided, inter alia, that DaimlerChrysler would pay the cost to
repair any defect related to factory materials or workmanship
occurring during the warranty period,'
It is undisputed that on May 6, May 28, June 24 and October 8, 2002,
the Jeep was returned to Bayside with a complaint that at idle
the engine would "surge and dip." On the first occasion,
Bayside found the idle speed control motor shorted and ordered a
new one which was installed on the second occasion. On the third
occasion, Bayside found no repairs necessary because, according to
DaimlerChrysler's ASE certified technician, Richard Regan, the
'A copy of the Warranty Information is attached to the Regan
affidavit as Exhibit A.
December 18, 2001, the Arhakises on or about that same date took
2
pursuant to the terms of a written limited warranty,
which
problem of the "surge and dip" was actually the normal manner by
which the vehicle was designed to operate. On the final occasion, Mr.
Regan again explained that the "problem" was the normal operation of
the Jeep and that the Jeep was operating as designed. On or about October
11, 2002, the Arhakises filed a "New Car Lemon Law Request for
Arbitration" form with the New York State Attorney General's office,
pursuant to General Business Law § 198-a(k) in the section of the
Arbitration form entitled "Car's Problem(s),"
the Arhakises inserted:
"At the RPM cluster, at idle engine surges and low idle, bellow
[sic) 500 RPM's is resulting causing the engine to drop power.
Car feels very slow. On three occasions engine has not
started."
At the Arbitration hearing, the Arhakises submitted records of the
Jeep's service and repair, three affidavits and testimonials from
witnesses present in the Jeep which attest to the fact that the Jeep, on
numerous occasions failed to start properly and that the RPM needle would
bounce and frequently dropped below the "500" mark on the RPM gauge.
Richard Regan testified on behalf of DaimlerChrysler, and a road
test of the Jeep was conducted at the hearing.
By decision dated February 10, 2003, arbitrator Armel Murph
found in favor of the Arhakises. The "Issues" section of the decision
fails to list as an issue whether the alleged problem of which the
Arhakises complained (idle dip and surge) was a defect or a normal design
characteristic. However, the -Summary of Evidence"
3
section lists under the manufacturer's section: "Yr. Richards and
Mr. Rose presented the following facts. It is normal for the idle to
adjust like that... The "Findings" section of the artitrator's
decision, likewise, fails to rule on the issue raised by
DaimlerChrysler, namely, whether the alleged problem of which the
Arhakises complained (idle dip and surge) was a defect or a normal
design characteristic.
In this Court's opinion, the arbitrator's failure to address the
threshold issue of whether the alleged problem of which the
Arhakises complained (idle dip and surge) was a defect or a normal design
characteristic is fatal.
Analysis
Because a Lemon Law arbitration is compulsory, "judicial review
under CPLR Article 75 is broad, requiring that the award be in accord
with due process and supported by adequate evidence in the record
.. .. The award must also be rational and satisfy the
186, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470). In cases of compulsory arbitration, due
process considerations require the courts to exercise a broader
scope of review than in cases of consensual arbitration (see Mount St.
Mary's Hosp. of Niagara Falls v Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 311 N.Y.S.2d
563; Matter of Nyack Hasp. v Government Employees Ins. Co., 139
arbitrary and capricious standards of CPLR article 78" (Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S. v State of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 175,
4
A.D.2d 515, 526 N.Y.S.2d 614). CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii), in
c
authorizing review of whether an arbitrator has exceeded his or her
power, includes review, in cases of compulsory arbitration, of
whether the award is supported by evidence or other basis in reason
appearing in the record (see Mount St. Mary's Hosp, of Niagara
Falls v Catherwood, supra; Matter of Petrofsky [Allstate Ins. Co.],
54 N.Y.2d 207, 211, 445 N.Y. S.2d 77).
Courts in their limited role are bound by an arbitrator's
factual findings, interpretation of the warranty, and judgment
interpretation of the warranty is superior to that of an arbitrator who has
made errors of judgment or fact (Matter of New York State
Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v
State of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 321, 704 N.Y.S.2d 910; In the matter of
Albany County Sheriff's Local v. Albany County, 63 N.Y.2d 654, 479
N.Y.S.2d 513, 468 N.E.2d 695).
However, under CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (iii) an award can be vacated when
the arbitrator executes his or her power in such an imperfect manner that
the award is not "final and definite." An award is not "final and
definite" when either "it leaves the parties unable to determine their
rights and obligations .... it does not resolve the controversy
submitted, or it creates a new controversy"
(Matter of Snyder-flax v. American Arbitration Assn., 1.96 A.D.2d
concerning remedies. A court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the arbitrators simply because it believes its
c
872, 874).
Conclusion
Here, the Court agrees with petitioner that the arbitrator
failed to address the threshold issue of whether the alleged problem
of which the Arhakises complained (idle dip and surge) was a defect or a
normal design characteristic is fatal. Thus, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Arbitrator's Award in favor of respondents
Konstantinos and Maria Arhakis (the "Arhakises") dated February 10, 2003
for a consumer refund, is vacated. It is further
ORDERED, that the matter is remanded for rehearing before a
different arbitrator.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: July 25, 2003
Jus
tice Carol R. Edmead
6
LID -E1E-2o2t 15 ©3
STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT _______________________________ COUNTY OF ALBANY ____
In the Matter of the Application
of General Motors Corporation, Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to CPLR 7511, DECISION AND JUDGMENT
INDEX NO. 5636-03
-against
MORRIS JACOBS,
Respondent.
(Supreme Court, Albany Co. Special Term - September 24, 2003)
(RJI No. 01-03-075376)
(Justice Bernard J. Malone, ., Presiding)
APpEARANCES:
The Rose Law Firm, PLLC
Attorneys for petitioners
(Justin E. Proper, Esq., of counsel)
501 New Karner Road Albany, N.Y. 12205
Morris Jacobs, pro se 2
Preshburg Blvd. Monroe
New, N.Y. 10950
MALONE, J:
The application of petitioner for a judgment pursuant to
CPLR 7511 vacating the arbitration award dated June 2, 2003 is
granted.
On June 25, 2002, respondent leased a new 2002 GMC Envoy XL from a
General Motors dealer (Monroe) and took delivery of the vehicle. The
vehicle was manufactured by the petitioner (GMC) . On March 12, 2003,
the respondent filed a request for new car Lemon Law arbitration with
the Attorney General, which he in turn out
forwarded to the New York State Dispute Resolution Association, Inc. (NYSDRA), the
State's administrator of Lemon Law arbitrations. NYSDRA assigned Arbitrator Al
Rubin to decide the matter and he held a hearing on May 6, 2003. The respondent
did
not contend that the vehicle was out of service more than 30 days within its first
18,000 miles of use or within two years of delivery thereby limiting the issue to
whether there were four or
more attempts at repair by the dealer and the defect continued to exist'.
The Arbitrator found that after six repair attempts Monroe successfully
repaired the malfunctioning headlights, brake lights, turn signals and fog lights.
However, pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the Attorney General on
March 25, 2003 to
defective lights were not corrected by the fourth repair attempt the respondent was
entitled to an award directing GMC to refund the purchase price. Prior to issuing the
Memorandum, the Attorney General's policy had been that the defective condition had
to continue to exist at the time of the arbitration hearing in order
'The Lemon Law requires a manufacturer that fails to remedy a defect after "a reasonable number
of attempts" to replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price. Business Law section 198-a(d)(1) and (2)
states that it shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts at repair have been undertaken
without success when, within the Lemon Law protection period (the first 18,000 miles of use or two years
from delivery), there have been four or more attempts at repair "but such nonconformity, defect or
condition continues to exist" or the vehicle is out of service due to the defect for 30 or more days during the
Lemon Law protection period.
2
all Lemon Law arbitrators the Arbitrator ruled that because the
P.0a:es b
U.i
for the consumer to prevail upon the four attempt presumption
because of the statutory language that "but such nonconformity,
defect or condition continues to exist." The Attorney General
believes the new construction of the statutory language was
compelled by the Second Department decision in Matter of Ba' Ridqe
Toyota, Inc. v Lyons, 272 Ad2d 39"1, in which that Court upheld a
lower court confirmation of an arbitrator's award in favor of the
consumer because the vehicle was out of service fat 15 days2 during
the Lemon Law protection period and there is no statutory direction
in the "out of service" portion of the Lemon Law requiring a showing
that the car was presently inoperable such as there is to show that
"such nonconformity, defect or condition continues to exist" under
the four or more repair times provision.
Because Lemon Law arbitration is compulsory, a court's
review of an arbitrator's award is broader than in contractual
with due process, have a rational basis, and be supported by
adequate evidence in the record ((Matter of Safari Motor Coaches v
Corwin, 225 AD2d 921). In this Court's view, an award is irrational
when it directly contradicts the statutory standard established by
the Legislature. Here, the Legislature commanded
'The "but of service" component of the statutory presumption is 15 days under the used car
Lemon Law and 30 days under the new car Lemon Law.
3
arbitration cases with that standard being that the award comport
W?
tc''-o3- 00: 48S O1 F. 0.5,, 06
0 V '1
that in order to prevail upon the "four or more" (emphasis supplied)
repair attempt presumption it must also be shown that "such
nonconformity, defect or condition continues to exist." A finding
that the Arbitrator specifically rejected in this case. This Court
agrees with the well-reasoned decision of Justice Elliott in the
case of Kucher v naimlerchryeler Coro., 194 Misc2d 688, which
rejected the Attorney General's conclusion that the
pav Ridae decision applies to both the "out of service category"
and the "four or more" repair attempt category upon the issue of
whether the consumer must demonstrate that the defect continues to
exist at the time of the arbitration hearing in order to prevail.
All papers, including this decision and judgment, are being
returned to the attorneys for the petitioner. The signing of this
decision and judgment shall not constitute entry or filing under
CFLR section 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that section relating to filing, entry and notice of
entry.
This memorandum shall constitute both the decision and
the judgment of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
DATED: ALBANY, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER ~(e , 2003
4
6NOU-06-200-- 15:014 P.05i49h
605
PAPERS CONSIDERED:
the notice of petition dated August 29, 2003;
the petition verified August 29, 2003, with exhibits; the
affirmation of Joseph Amicone dated August 29, 2003; the
letter of respondent dated September 22, 2003.
5
Tn7rl 0 MC Lki


i.
CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF New York COUNTY OF QUEENS
•° ° x
BARRY E. KUCHER
Plaintiff,
-against
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION and BAYSIDE CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH
JEEP INC.
Defendants.
x
ELLIOT, DAVID, JUDGE
This action was tried before the court in a nonjury trial. Plaintiff commenced
the action in Supreme Court; the action was transferred to this court pursuant to the
provisions of CPLR §325(d). Plaintiff seeks recovery against defendant
DaimIerChrysler Corporation (hereinafter "Chrysler") under General Business Law §
198-a, New York's New Car Lemon Law, for damages involving a leased motor
vehicle. The action was initially commenced against both Chrysler (the manufacturer
of the vehicle) and Bayside Chrysler Plymouth Jeep Inc. (the dealer, hereinafter
"Bayside"), alleging claims under the New York Lemon Law and the federal Magnuson
Moss Warranty Act. As the New York State Court of Appeals recently held that the
federal statute is inapplicable to leased vehicles', the action was discontinued against
the dealer, and the plaintiff proceeded solely against the manufacturer.
At the start of the trial, the court inquired of the attorneys for the parties as to
their position as to whether this court had jurisdiction of an action under the Lemon
Law. Their position was that this court does have jurisdiction under CCA §213, as one
for rescission of a contract. Although a trial was held, after researching the matter, it
is the opinion of this court that it lacks subject matter
'DiCinto v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 97 N.Y_ 2d 463
jurisdiction.
Although the parties have taken the position that the action is one for rescission,
the leased vehicle was leased by Bayside to the plaintiff. The remaining action is
against Chrysler, which was not a party to the lease. The action is not one for
rescission, but one for recovery against Chrylser pursuant to the Lemon Law.
The Court of Appeals has held that the replacement remedy provided by the
Lemon Law is equitable in nature and is not subject to a jury trial. Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State of New York, 75 N.Y.2d
175. As this court lacks equitable jurisdiction, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this
matter.
As a trial was held, and there may be an appeal on the issue of jurisdiction, the
court renders the following opinion on the merits of this action.
By lease dated June 22, 2000, plaintiff Barry E. Kucher leased a 2000 Chrysler
Town & Country van from Bayside. The plaintiff brought the car to Bayside for
servicing on numerous occasions, complaining at various times about excessive oil
consumption, and about what the plaintiff considered to be a defective horn.
Bayside performed various tests on the vehicle, finally concluding that the
engine had to be replaced. There is no dispute that plaintiff brought the vehicle in six
times with regard to the oil consumption issue, and that the engine was replaced with
a remanufactured engine on the sixth attempt to repair the condition.
The plaintiff brought the car to two separate dealers, complaining about the
operation of the horn. Initially, complaints were made when the car was brought to
the defendant Bayside. However, after moving to New Jersey, the plaintiff brought
the car to a dealer in New Jersey. Bayside found the horn to be functioning properly;
the New Jersey dealer later did replace a part involving the horn. According to the
plaintiff, the horn still does not function properly, is
L i' F 3
2
unsafe, and diminishes the value of the vehicle. The court viewed the operation of the
horn, once when operated by the plaintiff, and then by a witness for the defense.
The parties disagree as to the number of visits for repair of the horn, and
whether it was necessary for the plaintiff to actually complain about the horn on
each and every occasion. For reasons that will follow, it is not necessary to
determine the actual number of visits in connection with the horn.
New York's New Car Lemon Law is found in General Business Law §198-a,
which provides remedies to consumers during the first eighteen thousand miles of
operation or during the period of two years following the date of original delivery of a
motor vehicle to a consumer. GBL §198-a (c)(1) provides, inter alia, that if within said
period "....the manufacturer or its agents or authorized dealers are unable to repair or
correct any defect or condition which substantially impairs the value of the motor
vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer, at
the option of the consumer, shall replace the motor vehicle with a comparable motor
vehicle, or accept return of the vehicle from the consumer and refund to the consumer
the full purchase price or, if applicable, the lease price and any trade-in allowance plus
fees and charges...."
Subdivision (d) of section 198-a provides, that "It shall be presumed that a
reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to
the applicable express warranties, if: (1) the same nonconformity, defect or condition
has been subject to repair four or more times by the manufacturer or its agents or
authorized dealers within the first eighteen thousand miles of operation or during the
period of two years following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a
consumer, whichever is the earlier date, but such
nonconformity, defect or condition continues to exist; or (2) the vehicle is out of
service by reason of repair of one or more non conformities, defects or conditions
for a cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days during either period,
whichever is the earlier date.
3
5
l' . 4;914
To recapitulate, there are two basic categories under which the plaintiff alleges
that this case fits, First, that the vehicle was not repaired after four (4) visits, and
second, that the vehicle was out of service for more than thirty (30) calendar days.
For reasons that will follow, it is important to note that in the first category (number
of visits), the law specifically includes the words "but such nonconformity, defect or
condition continues to exist", whereas in the second category (more than 30 days), it
does not.
The Lemon Law provides that the consumer has the right to submit his
claim to an independent arbitrator approved by the state Attorney General. The
Rules for the administration of the program are found in Part 300 of Title 13 of the
Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York.
The Attorney General determines the interpretation of the Lemon Law for
the arbitrators, in that he provides forms for the arbitrators to reach certain
decisions based upon the answers to specific findings of fact.
Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to recover under the Lemon Law, both
under GBL §198-a(d)(1) and (d)(2). As to the latter, plaintiff's position is that his
vehicle was out of service by reason of repair of one or more defects for a cumulative
total of more than thirty calendar days. Further, plaintiff alleges that
he is not barred from recovery under subdivision (d)(1), despite the fact that the
vehicle engine problem was repaired prior to the date of trial. Plaintiff's position is that
under the Lemon Law, the consumer is entitled to a refund where the vehicle remains
defective after four repair attempts, irrespective of whether the vehicle has been
repaired prior to the time of trial. At the time of trial, the plaintiff cited the supporting
memorandum to GBL §198-a of Sen. Joseph Bruno in support of his position,
apparently because the memorandum in support did not discuss the requirement
that the defect continue to exist. After trial, plaintiffs counsel wrote to advise the
court of recent developments at the office of the Attorney General.
Prior to November 23, 2002, the position of the Attorney General was
4
141
6:". 13 4 P. 6
apparently to apply to both of the aforesaid categories the words "but such
nonconformity, defect or condition continues to exist", so that the arbitrator must find
for the manufacturer if the detects did not exist at the time of the hearing.
By memo dated November 23, 2002, the Attorney General changed his position,
citing Matter of Bay Ridge Toyota, inc. v. Lyons, 272 A.D.2d 397 (Second Department
May 8, 2000). That case provided, in relevant part: "One of the bases for the award,
that the vehicle was out of service due to repairs or malfunction for 15 or more days,
was not contingent upon whether the car was presently operable".'
However, the Attorney General changed his position with respect to both
categories, determining that the consumer may recover in both situations, ie: if the
vehicle was not repaired after 4 visits even if it was subsequently repaired, and if the
vehicle fit within the 30 day category, but was subsequently repaired.
In sum, the prior position of the Attorney General was that the consumer lost
under both categories if the defect did not exist at the time of the hearing; the current
position is that the consumer wins under both categories if the case at one time
fit into one of the two categories, whether or not the condition exists at the time of
the hearing. This court respectfully disagrees with both positions.
The statute provides in subdivision (d) that "It shall be presumed that a
reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to
the applicable express warranties, if: (1) the same nonconformity, defect or condition
has been subject to repair four or more times within the first eighteen thousand miles
of operation or during the period of two years following the date of original delivery of
the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is the earlier date, but such
nonconformity, defect or condition continues to exist [emphasis
'The case dealt with the Used Car Lemon Law, GBL§198-b, as opposed to the
New Car Lemon Law, GBL§198-a, which in many ways are mirror images. However,
with respect to used cars, the second category is limited to 15 days, as opposed to the
30 provided for with respect to new cars.
5
57
supplied]. "The legislative intent is to be ascertained from the words and language
used, and the statutory language is generally construed according to its natural and
most obvious sense, without resorting to artificial or forced construction". McKinney's
Statutes §94. It is clear that the legislature intended that for the consumer to recover
under this section, that the condition must exist at the time of trial.
The plaintiff complains that under this interpretation a plaintiff is forced to
either allow the manufacturer unlimited attempts to repair the vehicle pending trial, or
refuse access after the fourth attempt and be stuck with a defective vehicle for the
years it may take to get to trial. However, avoiding that conundrum is the intent of the
Lemon Law provision entitling the consumer to a swift determination by binding
arbitration. It is the consumer in this case that was determined to have his dispute
resolved by the court. He cannot now be heard to complain of the resulting delay.
As to the thirty day category, Bay R,dge Toyota, Inc. v. Lyons, supra, merely set
forth that the issue of whether the condition existed at the time of the hearing does not
apply to the thirty day category (fifteen for used cars). That case does not extend to
the "four attempts" category. While the plaintiff complains, and the court is
aware, that the Attorney General has issued to arbitrators a memorandum to the
contrary, this court holds that in order for the plaintiff to prevail under GBL§198-a (d)(1)
[the "four attempts category], the complained of condition(s) must still exist at the
time of trial,
As to the problem of excessive oil consumption, the vehicle was repaired
prior to trial by the replacement of the engine. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover
for that condition alone.
As set forth above, the parties disputed whether the vehicle was out of service for
more than thirty cumulative calendar days. It is clear that the vehicle was not out of
service for that period of time solely as a result of the engine, It is not necessary to
determine whether a defective horn brought the cumulative days
1,.
46
I!' 6394
out of service to more than thirty days. The court had the opportunity not only to
hear the testimony of the expert witnesses, but to actually see a demonstration of
the operation of the horn, The court finds that the horn in question is not defective,
and does not diminish the value of the vehicle to the consumer. The basic complaint
of the plaintiff is that the horn does not operate in the manner he would like. The
horn operates when pressed in specific areas on the steering wheel. However, it
does not function when pressed in every area of the steering wheel. There are small
bugles imprinted on the steering wheel, which indicate where to press to sound the
horn. The plaintiff wants the horn to sound when he presses on a different location
on the steering wheel. It appears from the evidence before the court that the horn
was not designed to operate in precisely the manner in which the plaintiff would
like. This does not qualifyts a defect, and does not substantially impair the value
of the vehicle to the consumer. The court agrees with the defendant manufacturer
that there is nothing wrong with the horn.
The visits for the repair of the horn are not to be considered in the calculation
of the cumulative total of days that the vehicle was out of service for repairs. The
vehicle was therefore not out of service for a cumulative total of over thirty days, as
required by GBL§198-a (d).
For the reasons set forth above, the court holds that the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief under the New Car Lemon Law, and the complaint is dismissed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: February 4, 2003
DAV
ID ELLIOT, J.C.C.
Appearances:
Plaintiff: Sadis & Goldberg, LLC 463 Seventh Ave., New York, NY 10018
Defendant: The Rose Law Firm, PLLC 501 New Karner Road, Albany, NY 12205
7
If, 11
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
JEANNE M. NIARZULLO. DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Index No. 00199312001
- against -
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and
HUDSON PONTIAC BUICK G`7C TRUCK, INC.,
Defendants.
._N
PA GONES, J•D., A.J.S.C.
Defendants move for an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff cross moves for
summary judgment on her seventh cause of action in the complaint. Plaintiff's complaint
contains eight causes of action denominated as "Counts I-VIII". Defendants move to dismiss each of
these causes of action on several grounds. In response to this motion plaintiff's counsel avers that
"plaintiff consents to the dismissal of all causes of action except count VII." Plaintiffs "Count VII" is
premised on General Business Law §193-a, New York's "Lemon Law."
It is well settled that in order "to obtain summary judgment it is necessary that the movant
establish his or her cause of action or defense 'sufficient to warrant the Court as a matter of law
in directing judgment' in his or her favor (CPLR 3212[b]), and he or she must do so by tender of
evidentiary proof in admissible form." (Friends of Animals v. Associated Fur Mfrs.. 46 NY2d 1065,
1067 [1979].) Stated another way, when defendants move for summary as herein, they must make out a
prima facie case of non-liability as a matter of law. Defendants assert on this application that plaintiff's
Lemon Law claim must be dismissed as a matter of law because it is uncontroverted that there are
presently no existing problems with plaintiff's vehicle. While defendant has submitted evidence which
establishes, on a prima facie basis, that plaintiff's vehicle is presently operable and free of defects, such
evidence is not sufficient to establish defendants' non-liability as a matter of law, (Matter of Bavridse
Toyota. Inc. V. Lyons, 272 AD2d 397 [2d Dept 2000].) Therefore, it is ordered that defendants' motion
is granted with regard to counts 1. 11, III. IV, V, VI, and Vi, and it is further ordered that those
counts are hereby dismissed. Defendants' motion to dismiss count VII is denied.
Plaintiff has submitted, in support of her cross motion, her affidavit which establishes, on a
prima facie basis, the following relevant facts. Plaintiff leased her new vehicle on or about April 29, 1999.
Approximately eleven months into the lease, plaintiff began to notice problems with the transmission.
Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to defendant Hudson on Nlarch 23. 2000. According to Hudson's own
service records plaintiff complained that "the transmission makes a Minding noise when it shifts
gear." Given an opportunity to make the repair, defendants 60 f
determined that no repair was necessary as they could not duplicate the noise. On that occasion, Hudson
retained plaintiff's vehicle for three days Plaintiff avers that subsequent to return of the vehicle the
transmission problem became worse and more frequent. She main brought the vehicle to Hudson on April
27, 2000. The Hudson service records indicate that plaintiff reported that there was a noise when
accelerating from a dead stop and again defendant made no repairs as it could not duplicate plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff's vehicle was retained for one day on that occasion. On May 15, 2000 plaintiff
returned the vehicle reporting again, according to Hudson's records, that the transmission shudders when
it shifts. At that time, Hudson advised plaintiff to make an appointment so that they could remove the
transmission pan to check the transmission. Hudson retained the vehicle for one day on May 15, 2000.
Plaintiff returned the car to Hudson on June 5, 2000 for the scheduled examination. At that time
Hudson, according to its records, determined that the reported problem was caused by "burnt clutches."
Hudson made repairs to the vehicle which they did not return to plaintiff until June 16, 2000 a period of
twelve days. Thereafter, plaintiff brought the car back to Hudson on July 5, 2000 with continued
complaints about the transmission. On that occasion, defendant Hudson retained the vehicle until July
21, 2000 at which time they advised plaintiff that they had made additional necessary repairs to the
transmission. When plaintiff picked up the vehicle on July 21. 2000 she felt the same transmission
problems as prior to the last repair. She returned to Hudson on the same day and advised them of her
complaint. At that time, Hudson indicated it would replace the entire transmission. On July 24, 2000
plaintiff, through her attorney, fully revoked her acceptance of the vehicle and placed GM on notice of
her claim. Shortly thereafter, Hudson advised plaintiff that the car was fixed. During this period between
March and July, 3000, the evidence submitted establishes that the vehicle was out of service for 40 days.
At that time, the evidence establishes, the vehicle had less than 18,000 miles and was less than two
years old. Plaintiff has established, on a prima facie basis, her entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law with regard to the seventh cause of action denominated "Count VII." In response to plaintiff's
cross motion, defendants have failed to submit any evidence which would demonstrate that there are
genuine issues of material fact. Instead, defendants have submitted a memorandum of law in which
counsel attempts, to reinterpret the uncontroverted facts set forth in plaintiff's affidavit and defendants'
own service records. The bare conclusory allegations, expressions of hope and unsubstantiated
assertions contained in the memorandum of law are insufficient to meet defendants' burden on this
cross motion. (Zuckernnn v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 (1959).) Therefore, it is ordered that
plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on her seventh cause of action is granted and she shall
have judgment against defendants herein. Submit judgment on five days' notice. It is further ordered
that the parties shall appear before this Court on March 7, 2003 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of
conducting an inquest to ascertain damages.
 

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